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K4003-93

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FEB 1 0 2003

In re

DECISION ON

PETITION FOR REGRADE

UNDER 37 CFR 10.7(c)

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

(petitioner) petitions for regrading her answers to questions 4, 8, 11 and 12 of the morning section and questions 9 and 26 of the afternoon section of the Registration Examination held on April 17, 2002. The petition is <u>denied</u> to the extent petitioner seeks a passing grade on the Registration Examination.

BACKGROUND

An applicant for registration to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) in patent cases must achieve a passing grade of 70 in both the morning and afternoon sections of the Registration Examination. Petitioner scored 67. On July 24, 2002, petitioner requested regrading, arguing that the model answers were incorrect.

As indicated in the instructions for requesting regrading of the Examination, in order to expedite a petitioner's appeal rights, a single final agency decision will be made regarding each request for regrade. The decision will be reviewable under 35 U.S.C. § 32. The Director of the USPTO, pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) and 37 CFR 10.2 and 10.7, has delegated the authority to decide requests for regrade to the Director of Patent Legal Administration.

OPINION

Under 37 CFR 10.7(c), petitioner must establish any errors that occurred in the grading of the Examination. The directions state: "No points will be awarded for incorrect answers or unanswered questions." The burden is on petitioners to show that their chosen answers are the most correct answers.

The directions to the morning and afternoon sections state in part:

Do not assume any additional facts not presented in the questions. When answering each question, unless otherwise stated, assume that you are a registered patent practitioner. The most correct answer is the policy, practice, and procedure which must, shall, or should be followed in accordance with the U.S. patent statutes, the USPTO rules of practice and procedure, the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP), and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) articles and rules, unless modified by a court decision, a notice in the Official Gazette, or a notice in the Federal Register. There is only one most correct answer for each question. Where choices (A) through (D) are correct and choice (E) is "All of the above," the last choice (E) will be the most correct answer and the only answer which will be accepted. Where two or more choices are correct, the most correct

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answer is the answer that refers to each and every one of the correct choices. Where a question includes a statement with one or more blanks or ends with a colon, select the answer from the choices given to complete the statement which would make the statement true. Unless otherwise explicitly stated, all references to patents or applications are to be understood as being U.S. patents or regular (non-provisional) utility applications for utility inventions only, as opposed to plant or design applications for plant and design inventions. Where the terms "USPTO" or "Office" are used in this examination, they mean the United States Patent and Trademark Office.

Petitioner has presented various arguments attacking the validity of the model answers. All of petitioner's arguments have been fully considered. Each question in the Examination is worth one point.

Petitioner has been awarded an additional 2 points for morning questions 11 and 12. Accordingly, petitioner has been granted an additional 2 points on the Examination. No credit has been awarded for morning questions 4 and 8 and afternoon questions 9 and 26. Petitioner's arguments for these questions are addressed individually below.

Morning question 4 reads as follows:

4. The specification in your client's patent application has been objected to for lack of enablement. To overcome this objection, your client may do any of the following except:

- (A) traverse the objection and specifically argue how the specification is enabling.
- (B) traverse the objection and submit an additional drawing to make the specification enabling.
- (C) file a continuation- in-part application that has an enabling specification.
- (D) traverse the objection and file an amendment without adding new matter in an attempt to show enablement.
- (E) traverse the objection and refer to prior art cited in the specification that would demonstrate that the specification is enabling to one of ordinary skill.
- 4. The model answer: (B) is the most correct answer. 35 U.S.C. § 113 reads "Drawings submitted after the filing date of the application may not be used (i) to overcome any insufficiency of the specification due to lack of an enabling disclosure." Since choice (A) may be done, 37 C.F.R. § 1.111, it is an incorrect answer to the above question. Since choice (C) may be done, 35 U.S.C. § 120, it is an incorrect answer to the above question. Since choice (D) may be done, 37 C.F.R. § 1.121, it is an incorrect answer to the above question. Since choice (E) may be done, 37 C.F.R. § 1.111, it also is an incorrect answer to the above question.

Petitioner argues that answer (C) is also correct. Petitioner contends that a continuation in part does not cause the original application as filed to comply with the objection and therefore selection (C) will not overcome the objection.

Petitioner's arguments have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's statement that a continuation in part does not cause the original application as filed to comply with the objection and therefore selection (C) will not overcome the objection, a continuation-in-part that provides the enabling descriptive matter as of the filing date of the continuation-in-part would comply with the objection and would therefore overcome the objection. Accordingly, model answer (B) is correct and petitioner's answer (C) is incorrect.

No error in grading has been shown. Petitioner's request for credit on this question is denied.

Morning question 8 reads as follows:

8. On March 20, 2000, Patsy Practitioner filed a patent application on widget Y for the ABC Company based on a patent application filed in Germany for which benefit of

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priority was claimed. The sole inventor of widget Y is Clark. On September 13, 2000, Patsy received a first Office action on the merits rejecting all the claims of widget Y under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being obvious over Jones in view of Smith. When reviewing the Jones reference, Patsy notices that the assignee is the ABC Company, that the Jones patent application was filed on April 3, 1999, and that the Jones patent was granted on January 24, 2000. Jones does not claim the same patentable invention as Clark's patent application on widget Y. Patsy wants to overcome the rejection without amending the claims. Which of the following replies independently of the other replies would not be in accordance with proper USPTO practice and procedures?

- (A) A reply traversing the rejection by correctly arguing that Jones in view of Smith fails to teach widget Y as claimed, and specifically and correctly pointing out claimed elements that the combination lacks.
- (B) A reply traversing the rejection by relying on an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.131 that antedates the Jones reference.
- (C) A reply traversing the rejection by relying on an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.132 containing evidence of criticality or unexpected results.
- (D) A reply traversing the rejection by stating that the invention of widget Y and the Jones patent were commonly owned by ABC Company at the time of the invention of widget Y, and therefore, Jones is disqualified as a reference via 35 U.S.C. § 103(c).
- (E) A reply traversing the rejection by perfecting a claim of priority to Clark's German application, filed March 21, 1999, disclosing widget Y under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)-(d).
- 8. The model answer: The correct answer is (D). The prior art exception in 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) only applies to references that are only prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), (f), or (g). In this situation, the Jones patent qualifies as prior art under § 102(a) because it was issued prior to the filing of the Clark application. See MPEP § 706.02(l)(3). Also, evidence or common ownership must be, but has not been, presented. Mere argument or a statement alleging common ownership does not suffice to establish common ownership. Answer (A) is a proper reply in that it addresses the examiner's rejection by specifically pointing out why the examiner failed to make a prima facie showing of obviousness. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.111. Answer (B) is a proper reply. See MPEP § 715. Answer (C) is a proper reply. See MPEP § 716. Answer (E) is a proper reply because perfecting a claim of priority to an earlier filed German application disqualifies the Jones reference as prior art.

Petitioner argues that answer (B) is correct. Petitioner contends that selection (B) is not in accord and therefore is the correct answer because the fact pattern fails to indicate whether the actual invention was prior to or subsequent to 1/1/96, a critical date for foreign inventions, and that selection (D) is in accord and therefore an incorrect answer because MPEP 700 states that a statement of ownership is sufficient evidence.

Petitioner's arguments have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's statement that selection (B) is not in accord and therefore is the correct answer because the fact pattern fails to indicate whether the actual invention was prior to or subsequent to 1/1/96, a critical date for foreign inventions, and that selection (D) is in accord and therefore an incorrect answer because MPEP 700 states that a statement of ownership is sufficient evidence, these assertions are not determinative. Selection (B) states on its face that the reply traversing the rejection by relying on an affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.131 antedates the Jones 4/3/99 reference. The provisions of 35 USC 104 allowing foreign WIPO countries to antedate references was earlier than a year before that date and therefore the affidavit or declaration under 37 CFR 1.131 is effective to antedate the reference. As to (D), the prior art exception in 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) only applies to references that are only prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), (f), or (g). In this situation, the Jones patent qualifies as prior art under § 102(a) because it was issued prior to the filing of the Clark application. See MPEP § 706.02(1)(3). Accordingly, model answer (D) is not in accord and therefore correct and petitioner's answer (B) is incorrect.

No error in grading has been shown. Petitioner's request for credit on this question is denied.

Afternoon question 9 reads as follows:

- 9. An applicant's claim stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious over Larry in view of Morris. Larry and Morris are references published more than one year before applicant's effective filing. Although the examiner cites no suggestion or motivation for combining the references, they are, in fact, combinable. Which of the following arguments could properly show that the claim is not obvious?
- (A) The inventions disclosed by Larry and Morris cannot be physically combined.
- (B) Neither Larry nor Morris provides an express suggestion to combine the references.
- (C) As recognized by businessmen, the high cost of Larry's device teaches away from combining it with the simpler device of Morris.
- (D) Absent a suggestion or motivation, the examiner has not shown that combining Larry's with Morris's device would have been within the level of ordinary skill of the art.
- (E) None of the above.
- 9. The model answer: (D) is correct. "The mere fact that references can be combined or modified does not render the resultant combination obvious unless the prior art also suggests the desirability of the combination." MPEP § 2143.01 (citing *In re Mills*, 916 F.2d 680, 16 USPQ2d 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1990)). Here, the examiner fails to show that

substituting Larry's device for another type of device in Morris would have been desirable. (A) is incorrect. The test of obviousness is not whether the features or elements of the references are physically combinable. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425, 208 USPO 871, 881 (CCPA 1981); In re Sneed, 710 F.2d 1544,1550, 218 USPO 385,389 (Fed. Cir. 1983). (B) is incorrect. "The rationale to modify or combine the prior art does not have to be expressly stated in the prior art; the rationale may be expressly or impliedly contained in the prior art or it may be reasoned from knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, established scientific principles, or legal precedent established by prior case law." MPEP § 2144 (citing In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Here, the argument overlooks the fact that a suggestion to combine Larry and Morris may be reasoned from knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, established scientific principles, or legal precedent established by prior case law. (C) is incorrect. "The fact that a combination would not be made by businessmen for economic reasons does not mean that a person of ordinary skill in the art would not make the combination because of some technological incompatibility." MPEP § 2145 (citing In re Farrenkopf, 713 F.2d 714, 718, 219 USPQ 1, 4 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). Here, the high cost of Larry's device does not teach away from a person of ordinary skill in the art combining it with Morris' device.

Petitioner argues that answer (C) is no more wrong than the model answer (D). Petitioner contends that MPEP 2100 states that "Fact that the claimed invention is within the capabilities of one of ordinary skill in the art is not sufficient by itself to establish prima facie obviousness", which directly contradicts (D).

Petitioner's arguments have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's statement that that answer (C) is no more wrong than the model answer (D) because MPEP 2100 states that "Fact that the claimed invention is within the capabilities of one of ordinary skill in the art is not sufficient by itself to establish prima facie obviousness", which directly contradicts (D), this is not the case. Selection (D) state that absent motivation to combine that was within the skill of one of ordinary skill in the art, obviousness is not shown, whereas the section of the MPEP copied by petitioner states that absent an enabling disclosure that was within the skill of one of ordinary skill in the art, obviousness is not shown. Therefore the quoted MPEP section does not contradict selection (D) and selection (D) is a correct answer. Accordingly, model answer (D) is correct and petitioner's answer (C) is incorrect.

No error in grading has been shown. Petitioner's request for credit on this question is denied.

Afternoon question 26 reads as follows:

26. Jack Flash filed an application for patent on December 16, 1998, disclosing and claiming self-extinguishing safety candles, methods of making them, and a special reflective housing for holding the burning candles. Following a three-way restriction, Mr.

Flash prosecuted the claims for the candle, and was granted a patent ("P1"), which issued on April 6, 1999. Mr. Flash filed a divisional application containing claims for the method of making the candles and for the reflective housing on April 5, 1999. The examiner did not restrict the claims, but before the first action on the merits was mailed, Mr. Flash suffered business reversals and canceled the claims to the reflective housing to reduce the cost of obtaining his patent. A patent on the method of making the candles ("P2"), issued on November 30, 1999. Although you reviewed and signed all of the papers in the prosecution of the applications, your assistant, Annie, did all the work under your supervision. On April 1, 2001, Mr. Flash jumps into your office. He has just won a million dollars on some television game show you've never heard of, and he wants to "revive his patents." He is also concerned about an article he tore out of the February 1986 issue of the trade publication Wicks and Sticks, that shows a drawing of a dissimilar candle that would nevertheless raise a question of patentability, with the caption "It's just a dream; it can't be made we've tried a thousand times, don't bother." He also has a video tape first sold by a local hobbyist at his store in October 1999, showing a process of candle making that may be within the scope of his process claims. "But it's such a stupid way to do things - it's expensive and it doesn't work very well- it doesn't even make a safety candle," Jack shouts, jumping on your desk. He is so excited he can barely get the words out. Annie volunteers to work with him to figure out what he can do. On the next day, Friday, April 2, just as you are getting ready to close up and head for the LeTort Creek with your cane rod Annie drops five proposals on your desk. After reviewing Annie's proposals, but before you leave, you must instruct her to take the action that will best protect Mr. Flash's patent rights. Which of the following acts would be in accordance with proper USPTO practice and procedure, and Annie should be authorized to follow?

- (A) File a broadening reissue application on P1, alleging error in failing to claim sufficiently broadly by not filing claims for the reflective housing.
- (B) File a request for reexamination of P1 based on the Wicks and Sticks article.
- (C) File a new, nonprovisional patent application claiming benefit of the filing date of parent application that issued as patent P2.
- (D) File a request for reexamination of P2 in view of the video tape, intending to narrow the process claims to avoid the video tape if the USPTO finds a significant new question of patentability, and seeking to add claims to the reflective housing.
- (E) File a broadening reissue of P2, alleging error in claiming the process too broadly, because it covers the process disclosed on the video tape, and alleging further error in claiming less than the inventor had a right to claim, by not claiming the reflective housing.
- 26. The model answer: The best answer is (B), because, under the facts as stated, the Wicks and Sticks article "shows a drawing of a dissimilar candle that would nevertheless

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raise a question of patentability" (italics added). Although the published article might not be anticipatory, it can raise a substantial new question of patentability under 37 C.F.R. § 1.515. (A) is incorrect because it is not error to fail to claim restricted inventions that were not elected and that were not claimed in divisional applications. In re *Orita* 550 F.2d 1277, 1280, 193 USPQ 145, 148 (CCPA 1977); MPEP § 1450. (C) is not the best answer because there is no copendency between the new nonprovisonal application and parent application that issued as patent P2. 35 U.S.C. § 120. (D) is not correct because a request for reexamination cannot be based on a video tape broadened claims may not be filed in a reexamination. (E) is not the best answer because it is not clear there is an "error" under 35 U.S.C. § 251 with respect to the claims for the reflective housing. MPEP §§ 1402, 1450.

Petitioner argues that answer (E) is correct. Petitioner contends that the error in claiming the process too broadly, because it covers the process disclosed on the video tape, would be an error under 35 U.S.C. § 251, the error of failing to claim the reflective housing might be an error under 35 U.S.C. § 251, and (E) is a better answer than (B) because of greater convenience, scope, and avoidance of an examiner's opinion regarding new issue of patentability.

Petitioner's arguments have been fully considered but are not persuasive. Contrary to petitioner's statement that the error in claiming the process too broadly, because it covers the process disclosed on the video tape, would be an error under 35 U.S.C. § 251, the error of failing to claim the reflective housing might be an error under 35 U.S.C. § 251, and (E) is a better answer than (B) because of greater convenience, scope, and avoidance of an examiner's opinion regarding new issue of patentability, these arguments are not supported by the facts and USPTO rules and regulations. The facts unambiguously indicate that Jack Flash does not consider the video to be prior art that would make the claims too broad. Jack said "But it's such a stupid way to do things - it's expensive and it doesn't work very well- it doesn't even make a safety candle." More to the point, the video was not published until after his first application was filed, negating the video as prior art no matter how pertinent. Jack cannot claim that not including the reflective housing claims because Jack clearly had such claims originally and cancelled them. MPEP 1450 states "if the original patent specification or the prosecution history of the original patent shows an intent not to claim the newly presented invention, that invention cannot be added by reissue. In these situations, the reissue claims should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 251 for lack of defect in the original patent and lack of error in obtaining the original patent. See also MPEP § 1412.01." Because the errors in selection (E) cannot be used to file for reissue, the other factors suggesting that (E) is a better alternative to (B) are moot. Accordingly, model answer (B) is correct and petitioner's answer (E) is incorrect.

No error in grading has been shown. Petitioner's request for credit on this question is denied.

ORDER

For the reasons given above, two points have been added to petitioner's score on the Examination. Therefore, petitioner's score is 69. This score is insufficient to pass the Examination.

Upon consideration of the request for regrade to the Director of the USPTO, it is ORDERED that the request for a passing grade on the Examination is <u>denied</u>.

This is a final agency action.

Robert J. Spar

Director, Office of Patent Legal Administration
Office of the Deputy Commissioner
for Patent Examination Policy